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NOTES

Demanding Accountability Where
Accountability
Is
Due:
A
Functional Necessity Approach to
Diplomatic . Immunity Under the
Vienna Convention
ABSTRACT

This Note addresses the inability of domestic workers to
seek redress for exploitation by diplomat employers. In
examining the legal quagmire facing these workers, this Note
highlights a departure by courts from the functional necessity
theory underlying the Vienna Convention. Courts now rely
wholly on the U.S. State Department's interpretation of the
scope of diplomatic immunity, communicated through
"Statements of Interest." The significant deference given to such
statements has had dire consequences for exploited victims.
Under a functional necessity approach, domestic workers are
able to demand redress, as exploitation is a private act-i.e., not
in furtherance of the diplomatic mission-undertaken for
personal gain. In contrast, the State Department's broad grant
of immunity to diplomats has effectively eroded any exception to
immunity hitherto relied upon by plaintiffs. This Note questions
the delegation of interpretive functions to the Executive Branch
and proposes a return to restrictive immunity, as postulated by
functional necessity theory.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, publicized instances of domestic workers
alleging exploitation and abuse by diplomat employers have shed
light on a hidden form of forced servitude.' In the typical narrative,
domestic workers are induced by fraudulent employment contracts
and false promises to accompany diplomat families to the United
States. 2 Upon arrival, they discover that they are paid less than
minimum wage; are forced to endure inhumane work hours; and
become subjected to verbal, physical, and psychological abuse. 3
Domestic workers bringing actions against diplomat employers have
repeatedly had their cases dismissed for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.4 In concluding that diplomatic immunity shields the
employer from such suits, judges have relied almost exclusively on
policy statements submitted by the State Department in the form of
"Statements of Interest."'5 Hence, few courts have endeavored to
scrutinize the exact contours of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (VCDR) and its enumerated exceptions to diplomatic
immunity.
Cases involving diplomats likely constitute a small percentage of
all domestic worker abuse cases; 6 however, they raise complex legal

1.
See, e.g., Domestic Workers Who Accused Diplomats of Human Trafficking
Settle with Kuwaiti Government, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 15, 2012),
https://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/domestic-workers-who-accused-diplomats-humantrafficking-settle-kuwaiti-government [http://perma.cc/FL2E-2FS6] (archived Jan. 20,
2014) ("The Kuwaiti government agreed to settle a case brought by three women who
claimed that they were trafficked to the United States by a Kuwaiti diplomat and his
wife and forced to work . . . against their will and under slavery-like conditions.");
Traver Riggins, Human Trafficking Allegations Test Diplomatic Immunity, CTR. OF
PUB. INTEGRITY (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/04/28/4400/
human-trafficking-allegations-test-diplomatic-immunity [http://perma.cclWN3H-CKA2]
(archived Jan. 20, 2014) (describing a human trafficking lawsuit brought by four
women against a Qatari diplomat in the United States).
2.
See Janie A. Chuang, Achieving Accountability for Migrant Domestic
Worker Abuse, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1627, 1643-44 (2010) (discussing how some diplomats
manipulate and exploit domestic workers).
3.
See id. at 1629 ("[T]hese workers often work long days for little to no pay,
labor under overwhelming debt, face threats from their employers, and suffer
psychological and physical abuse.").
4.
See, e.g., Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 538-39 (4th Cir. 1996) (deferring to
the State Department's narrow interpretation of the commercial activity exception, as
communicated through a Statement of Interest, and ultimately dismissing case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction under the Diplomatic Relations Act); Montuya v. Chedid,
779 F. Supp. 2d 60, 63-65 (D.D.C. 2011) (same); Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123,
138-40 (2d Cir. 2010) (same); Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 126 (D.D.C.
2009) (same); Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila, 479 F. Supp. 2d 187, 192-93 (D.D.C. 2007)
(same).
5.

Id.

6.
But see Sarah Fitzpatrick, Diplomatic Immunity at Issue in DomesticWorker Abuse Cases, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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questions that strike at the core of American attitudes toward the
VCDR. To contextualize the dilemma facing domestic workers of
diplomat families, Part II provides an overview of the VCDR,
including its relevant provisions, stated purpose, and theoretical
basis. Part III then discusses abuses of diplomatic privilege and
exploitation of domestic workers. Part IV addresses a core obstacle to
redress: courts' narrow construction of the commercial activity
exception to diplomatic immunity. This Part pays close attention to
the interaction of the Judiciary and the Executive in delineating the
scope of diplomatic immunity. Part V evaluates the limits of previous
attempts to rethink diplomatic immunity to better accommodate
requests for redress. Finally, Part VI advocates adoption of a
functional necessity approach to diplomatic immunity, which would
limit the issue of unchecked exploitation. This Part also suggests how
each branch of government may facilitate and accommodate such a
shift.

II.

THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

In 1969, the United States ratified the VCDR, 7 which codified
longstanding diplomatic and consular practices with the purpose of
maintaining the "sovereign equality of States[,] . . . international

peace and security, and the promotion of friendly relations among
nations."8 The VCDR, which is a non self-executing treaty, gained
legal force in the United States through the enactment of the
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978,9 in which Congress "established the
Vienna Convention as the sole U.S. law governing diplomatic
privileges and immunities."1 0 The VCDR states in relevant part that
a "diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal
dyn/content/article/2009/09/19/AR2009091901864.html
[http://perma.cclUX3V-D4DU]
(archived Jan. 20, 2014) (quoting Suzanne Tomatore, Director of the Immigrant
Women and Children Project at the New York City Bar Justice Center)
("Unfortunately, cases involving diplomatic employers represent a disproportionate
amount of the domestic-worker abuse cases we see."); Amy Tai, Note, Unlocking the
Doors to Justice: Protectingthe Rights and Remedies of Domestic Workers in the Face of
Diplomatic Immunity, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 175, 180 (2007) ("While
there is no official figure indicating how many diplomats violate the rights of their
workers, the cases filed in court, covered by the media, and reported upon by nongovernmental organizations demonstrate that the problem is pervasive and
underreported.").
7.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on
Disputes, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227 [hereinafter VCDR].
Id. at pmbl.
8.
9.
See Diplomatic Relations Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 254 (West 2013) (repealing
1790 legislation on diplomatic immunity and bringing U.S. law in line with the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations).
10.
LINDA S. FREY & MARSHA L. FREY, THE HISTORY OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
490 (1999).
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jurisdiction of the receiving State . . . [and] its civil and
administrative jurisdiction."" As such, diplomatic agents or members
of their immediate family may not be arrested or detained; may not
have their residences entered and searched; may not be subpoenaed
as witnesses; and may not be prosecuted by the nation in which they
are serving their country. 12 The VCDR is premised on the belief that
an international convention on diplomatic relations, privileges, and
immunities fosters friendly relations among nations, "irrespective of
their differing constitutional and social systems."' 3
While crucial to diplomatic and foreign relations, the VCDR
recognizes certain exceptions. Article 31(1) outlines three exceptions
to the immunity afforded to diplomats (and their families 4) in the
receiving state:
A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from
its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
(a)
A real action relating to private immovable property
situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on
behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;
(b)
An action relating to succession in which the diplomatic
agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private
person and not on behalf of the sending State;
(c)
An action relating to any professional or commercial
activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside
15
his official functions.

The third exception, hereinafter referred to as the "commercial
activity exception,"' 6 has proven controversial due to its ambiguous
language. 7 The VCDR provides no definition of what constitutes
"commercial activity," nor does the exception itself include any
restricting qualifiers limiting the scope of the term.'8 As a result, this

11.
VCDR, supra note 7, at art. 31(1).
12.
See id. at arts. 29-31, 37 (proclaiming that the person and private
residence of the diplomatic agent shall be inviolable).
13.
Id. at pmbl.
14.
Article 37 provides for the same immunity for "members of the family of a
diplomatic agent forming part of his household . . . , if they are not nationals of the
receiving State." Id. at art. 37.
15.
Id. at art. 31(1).
16.
Id. at art. 31(1)(c).
17.
See infra Parts III.C, IV (presenting judicial interpretations of the language
of the commercial activity exception).
18.
See VCDR, supra note 7, at art. 31(1)(c) (stating "an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving
State outside his official functions").
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exception has generated litigation over the nature of activities
undertaken by diplomats outside of their official duties. 19
Aside from the enumerated exceptions, there are only limited
opportunities for circumventing immunity. Perhaps the most effective
method of avoiding immunity is set forth in Article 32 of the VCDR.20
Article 32 builds on the previously listed rights of diplomats to
immunity from arrest, detention, and civil and criminal prosecution 21
but asserts that the sending country may waive this immunity at any
time. 22 Yet, states have proven exceedingly unwilling to grant such
waivers, even in cases where the cost of doing so would be minimal. 2 3
As a last resort, a receiving state may assert a persona non grata
claim, as stipulated in Article 9.24 Under this provision, the receiving
state may at any point and for any reason notify the sending state
that the diplomat at issue is a persona non grata, or unwanted
person.25 The sending state must then either recall the diplomat or
terminate his or her duties in the host state. 26 Although a persona
non grata procedure appears simple, it is rarely used in practice. Fear
of reciprocity 2 7 and disrupted diplomatic relationships weigh in favor
of simply absorbing the costs of misdeeds. 28
Due to the infrequency with which a country agrees to waive
immunity and the significant costs involved in persona non grata
procedures, debates over diplomatic immunity have generally focused
on the application and permissible scope of the three exceptions

19.
See infra Parts III.C, IV (analyzing various lawsuits brought by domestic
workers that have necessitated the interpretation of the language of Article 31(1)(c) of
the VCDR).
20.
VCDR, supra note 7, at art. 32.
21.
See id. at arts. 29, 31 (providing for diplomatic immunity from arrest,
detention, and prosecution).
See id. at art. 32(1) ("The immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents
22.
and of persons enjoying immunity under Article 37 may be waived by the sending
State.").
See infra Part V.A (explaining the difficulties that the State Department
23.
has faced in its requests for waivers of diplomatic immunity).
24.
See VCDR, supra note 7, at art. 9 (providing an alternate method to
circumvent diplomatic immunity).
25.
See id. ("The receiving State may at any time and without having to explain
its decision, notify the sending State that the head of the mission or any member of the
diplomatic staff of the mission is a person non grata or that any other member of the
staff of the mission is not acceptable.").
26.
See id. at art. 9(1) ("In any such case, the sending State shall, as
appropriate, either recall the person concerned or terminate his functions with the
mission.").
27.
See infra Part IV.B (describing the Executive's fear of reciprocity).
28.
See infra Part III.A (presenting a cost-benefit analysis of diplomatic
immunity).
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enumerated in Article 32.29 This Note will focus on the third of these
exceptions: the commercial activity exception.

A. Theoretical Grounds for Diplomatic Immunity
immunity:
seek to justify diplomatic
Three theories
representative of the sovereign, extraterritoriality, and functional
necessity.30 The early theory of representative of the sovereign, also
known as personal representation, holds that "the representative's
privileges are similar to those of the sovereign herself, and an insult
to the ambassador is an insult to the dignity of the sovereign."31 This
theory has three major flaws. 32 First, granting the foreign envoy the
same degree of immunity as the sending state would "place the
individual diplomat above the law of the host state."3 3 Second, due to
the evolution of popular rule, it is not always clear whom the
diplomat represents. 34 Third, "the theory extends no basis for
protecting diplomats from the consequences of their private
actions."35 Consequently, the theory has been largely discredited. 36
The second theory, the theory of extraterritoriality, assumes that
a diplomat is always on the soil of the sending country.37 As a result,

29.
Thus far, the United States has never labeled a diplomat charged with
exploiting a domestic worker a persona non grata. While waivers have been attempted
from time to time, they have never been successful in this context. See, e.g., Sabbithi v.
Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 125 (D.D.C. 2009) (describing how the U.S. Department
of State asked Kuwait to waive immunity for a diplomat accused of exploitation of
domestic workers, and how such a request was declined).
30.
See Mitchell S. Ross, Note, Rethinking Diplomatic Immunity: A Review of
Remedial Approaches to Address the Abuses of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, 4
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 173, 177 (1989) (presenting three theoretical bases for
diplomatic immunity in a discussion of the history and development of diplomatic
immunity).
31.
Leslie Shirin Farhangi, InsuringAgainst Abuse of DiplomaticImmunity, 38
STAN. L. REV. 1517, 1520-21 (1986).
32.
See Ross, supra note 30, at 177 (criticizing the "representation of the
sovereign" theory on the grounds that it is overbroad in placing the individual diplomat
above the law of the host state, undermined by modern nation states, and lacking in
theoretical basis to provide protection for private acts).
33.
See id. (citing C. WILSON, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 4
(1967)) (presenting the first ground upon which the personal representation theory is
rejected).
34.
See id. at 177-78 (citing WILSON, supra note 33) (crediting the invalidation
of this theory, in part, on the decline of the powerful monarch after the American and
French revolutions).
35.
See id. at 178 (citing WILSON, supra note 33) ("Since the theory of personal
representation fails to extend a foundation for immunity to private acts, it must be
rejected as the sole juridical foundation of diplomatic privileges and immunities.").
36.
See id. (concluding that the analysis discredits the personal representation
theory on three grounds).
37.
See Farhangi, supra note 31, at 1520 (describing this assumption as "legal
fiction").
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a diplomat is not subject to the receiving country's laws. 38 The role of
extraterritoriality theory in today's discourse is not entirely clear.
While some argue that the codification of the VCDR marked the
official rejection of extraterritoriality, 3 9 others hold that this legal
fiction maintains widespread support. 4 0 Many agree, however, that
the theory sets forth an unjustifiably broad scope of diplomatic
immunity. 4 '
The third and most widely recognized justification for diplomatic
immunity is the theory of functional necessity. 42 This theory holds
that diplomats engaging in official acts are immune to the
jurisdictions of American courts. 43 Under this line of reasoning,
diplomatic immunity protects those acts incidental to the mission 44
but "does not, however, afford protection and benefits to the diplomat
as a person." 45 Hence, under this theory, when a diplomat "acts
outside of the normal sphere of conducting international relations, a
question arises as to whether immunity still applies." 46 A closer
examination of the VCDR demonstrates how functional necessity
theory pervades its text, purpose, and spirit.
The plain text of the VCDR's preamble expresses the very tenets
of functional necessity theory by stating that although diplomatic
privileges and immunities are necessary to diplomatic functions, 4 7
their purpose "is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient
performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing

38.
See Ross, supra note 30, at 178 (concluding that the diplomat is immune to
the receiving state's laws for lack of local residence).
39.
See FREY & FREY,
supra note 10,
at 483
("The Vienna
Convention . . . signified the rejection of the fiction of extraterritoriality.").
40.
See Ross, supra note 30, at 178 (citing Stephen L. Wright, Comment,
Diplomatic Immunity: A Proposalfor Amending the Vienna Convention to Deter Violent
Criminal Acts, 5 B.U. INTL'L L.J. 177, 203-04 (1987) (noting the widespread support
this theory received from international legal scholars and judicial opinions).
41.
See id. (citing WILSON, supra note 33, at 1-5)(explaining that "if diplomatic
premises covered an entire section of a city, that part of the city would become
untouchable by local law enforcement because it is not theoretically part of the
territory of the receiving state").
42.
See, e.g., id. (citing WILSON, supra note 33, at 17) (portraying functional
necessity as "the most widely accepted current justification of diplomatic immunity");
Farhangi, supra note 31, at 15-21 (describing functional necessity as "currently
popular"); FREY & FREY, supra note 10, at 484-85 (describing consensus at the Vienna
Convention as "function determined privilege").
43.
See Ross, supra note 30, at 178-79 ('This theory provides that the diplomat
is not subject to the jurisdiction of local courts, because this would hamper the
functions of diplomatic relations.").
44.
See id. at 179 (allowing diplomats to conduct their diplomatic business
without fear of prosecution in local courts).
45.
Id.
Id.
46.
47.
See Farhangi, supra note 31, at 1521 (justifying immunity on the grounds
that "diplomats could not fulfill their diplomatic functions without such privileges").
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States." 48 The preamble's disaggregation of "individuals" and
"diplomatic missions" is perhaps most telling of the notion that
official acts rather than individuals are immunized. 49
The structure of the VCDR further reflects the drafter's intention
to take a restrictive view of diplomatic immunity, which eschews
blanket provisions of immunity. 50 Importantly, the VCDR outlines
and distinguishes between different levels of immunity granted to
different categories of staff, suggesting that immunity can only be
justified to the extent that it is necessary to carry out the functions of
a specific position. 51 The VCDR's enumeration of carved-out
exceptions further confirms that immunity was meant to be limited. 52
Moreover, historical inquiry reveals the drafters' desire to move
away from the individual diplomat and toward a focus on the
diplomatic mission, thus limiting the scope of diplomatic immunity in
a manner consistent with functional necessity.53 Prior to the VCDR,
countries like the United States granted blanket immunity to
ambassadors, ambassadors' administrative staffs, and ambassadors'
personal servants. 54 Any attempt to limit or challenge the extent of
such immunity was considered a crime.5 5 In stark contrast with such
nondiscriminatory, blanket immunity, the drafters included language
specifically delineating permissive degrees of immunity for different
categories of staff.5 6 In doing so, the drafters forced a shift away from
the individual toward the mission by defining immunity in terms of
job functions. 57 As dictated by functional necessity, immunity was
only justified insofar as it was necessary to the furtherance of the
mission.

48.
VCDR, supra note 7, at pmbl.
49.
See Ross, supra note 30, at 180-81 ("The preamble to the Vienna
Convention reflected the internal concern of giving unlimited immunity to all classes of
diplomats.").
50.
See FREY & FREY, supra note 10, at 485 ("The limitations on jurisdictional
immunity for diplomats, staff, and family reflected the restrictive position that
prevailed at Vienna.").
51.
Wright, supra note 40, at 207 (noting that the Convention provides no
immunity to diplomats and administrative or technical staff for criminal conduct).
52.
FREY & FREY, supra note 10, at 485.
53.
See Ross, supra note 30, at 180 (citing M. OGDON, JURIDIcIAL BASES OF
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY, at vii (1936)) (noting a shift of world public opinion against
diplomatic privileges).
54.
See id. (noting that the Act of April 30, 1790 provided blanket immunity to
ambassadors and their administrative staff, as well as their personal servants).
55.
See id. (providing that the statute's protective nature criminalized the act
of bringing a suit against any individual with diplomatic immunity).
56.
See id. at 181-82 (citing Wright, supra note 40, at 204) (noting the Vienna
Convention establishes four categories of personnel, each with a different level of
immunity).
57.
See id. (providing that the Vienna Convention look to the category of
personnel when determining immunity).

510

VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 47-501

Finally, the legislative history of the VCDR removes any
lingering doubt as to whether the drafters intended a restrictive
definition of diplomatic immunity.5 8 Beyond the provisions in the
VCDR, numerous other proposals were originally submitted to the
committee urging even more restrictive immunity than that which
was ultimately adopted. 59 Importantly, the rejection of these
proposals stemmed from disagreement over the specific language of
the proposals-not disagreement with the restrictive scope. 60 The
prevalence of restrictive proposals coupled with the relative lack of
opposition to such a scope suggests that a limited scope of immunity
was generally, if not universally, understood and accepted among the
drafters. 61
The theoretical principles underlying the VCDR provide insight
into the permissible scope of diplomatic immunity. As demonstrated
in this Note, the plain text, purpose, and spirit of the VCDR reflect
the drafters' adherence to the functional necessity theory. A
compelling argument can therefore be made for a more restrictive
reading of the VCDR, which would limit the ability of diplomats to
shield themselves from liability in cases involving exploitation of
vulnerable populations for personal gain.
III. THE ISSUE OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Despite the traces of functional necessity evident in the text,
structure, and purpose of the convention, American courts have
rejected a restrictive reading of immunity. Instead of guarding the
line between official and nonofficial conduct, or adhering to a
presumption against immunity for acts furthering personal interests,
courts have followed a de facto rule against interfering with
diplomatic immunity. 62 By allowing blanket privileges, the United
States has invited various forms of abuse of immunity, as illustrated

See Wright, supra note 40, at 207 (suggesting that legislative history
58.
indicates varying levels of immunity were contemplated for diplomatic staff and
technical or administrative staff).
See id. at 208 (highlighting the several proposals made at the Vienna
59.
Convention with substantially narrower immunity for administrative staff).
60.
See id. at 208-09 ("At the United Nations conference convened to draft the
Vienna Convention, many of the proposed amendments considered to restrict the scope
of immunity failed to pass because of abstentions. The United States interpreted these
failures as arising from disagreement with the specific language of the proposals rather
than disagreement with the proposals' restrictive principles.").
See id. (providing that these proposals are evidence of an intent to provide
61.
limited immunity).
62.
See infra Part IV.A (discussing the phenomenon of why "[t]o date, most, if
not all, cases involving domestic workers alleging to have been exploited by diplomats
with absolute immunity have been dismissed").
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by the experiences of exploited domestic workers employed by
diplomats.63

A. Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity and Cost-Benefit Analysis
Diplomatic immunity necessarily invites limited instances of
abuse, such as unpaid tickets or unnecessarily risky or negligent
behavior. For example, a 2006 study by the National Bureau of
Economic Research found that between November 1997 and 2002 in
New York City, "diplomats accumulated over 150,000 unpaid parking
tickets, resulting in outstanding fines of more than $18 million." 64
The United States has consistently taken the position that absorbing
the costs of such abuses is preferable to disrupting diplomatic
relations. 65
This Note agrees that the cost-specifically, the risk of
reciprocity 66-of holding foreign diplomats accountable for such petty
abuses as parking violations exceeds the benefits derived therefrom.
When the abuse takes on a different magnitude, however, so as to
implicate the lives and rights of underprivileged individuals, the
cost-benefit analysis arguably begins to shift. This Note suggests
that the government's divergence from the text, purpose, and spirit of
the VCDR becomes unjustifiable when it results in the exploitation of
human labor for personal gain.
B. The Vulnerability of Domestic Workers Employed by Diplomats
When diplomat families relocate to a receiving state, they
frequently bring household help from their home countries. Most
domestic workers traveling with diplomat families enter the United
States on A-3 6 7 or G-5 68 visas. 69 Consular officers in each state are
63.

See infra Part III.C.

Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, Cultures of Corruption:Evidence from
Diplomatic Parking Tickets, Working Paper 12312, THE NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RES.
64.

(June 2006), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl2312 (archived Feb. 28, 2014).
See infra Part IV.A. (quoting the Tabion court, stating that it "is mindful
65.
that ... what may prevent parties from obtaining redress in our courts also serves to
protect American diplomats and their families from what we might consider legal
abuses overseas. This balancing is a policy decision this Court should not challenge.").
See infra Part IV.B (discussing the concept of reciprocity and how it affects
66.
diplomatic relations).
See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-892, U.S. GOVERNMENT'S
67.
EFFORTS TO ADDRESS ALLEGED ABUSE OF HOUSEHOLD WORKERS BY FOREIGN
DIPLOMATS WITH IMMUNITY COULD BE STRENGTHENED 2 (2008) [hereinafter GAO

REPORT] ("Most of the household workers brought to the United States by foreign
diplomats arrive with A-3 visas-as employees of officials from foreign embassies,
consulates, or governments-or with G-5 visas-as employees of foreign officials for
international organizations, such as the United Nations or the World Bank."). Given to
employees of officials from foreign embassies, consulates, or governments. See infra
note 69.
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responsible for ensuring that employment contracts submitted by A-3
and G-5 visa applicants comply with the Foreign Affairs Manual,
which sets forth such requirements as minimum wage. 70 However,
research has shown that consular officers are often confused about
the reasons for which they may refuse A-3 or G-5 visas.7 1 Moreover,
they are often ill prepared to scrutinize employment contracts
between domestic workers and diplomats.7 2 As a result, visas are
frequently granted to domestic workers whose employment contracts
violate American laws.73
In 2008, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
investigated the scope of alleged abuse of domestic workers by
diplomat employers and how often fraudulent or illegal employment
contracts were accepted by consular officers granting A-3 or G-5
visas. 74 While the exact number of domestic workers abused by
diplomats is difficult to ascertain, the GAO identified forty-two
household workers with A-3 or G-5 visas who allege to have been
abused by foreign diplomats with immunity from 2000 through
2008.75 The commission noted that at the time of the report, the total
number of alleged incidents was likely higher than the reported
number for four reasons: (1) victims' fears of contacting law
enforcement; (2) Nongovernmental organizations' protection of victim
confidentiality; (3) limited information on some cases handled by the
U.S. government; and (4) the challenges federal agencies face in
identifying cases since no office is the central repository for
information on allegations. 76

68.
Given to employees of foreign officials for international organizations, such
as the United Nations or the World Bank. See infra note 69.
69.
GAO REPORT, supra note 67, at 2.
70.
Id. at 5.
71.
See id. (highlighting that after speaking with consular offices, the GAO
noted that many appeared unaware or unclear of the requirements and grounds for
refusal).
72.
See id. (noting that while A-3 and G-5 visas require consular offices to
determine employment status, consular officials are not provided with explicit
guidance as to how to complete that determination).
73.
Note that it remains unclear whether the Wilberforce Act has had an
impact on the frequency of such occurrences; the GAO research referenced was
performed prior to the enactment of this statute.
74.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 67, at 30 (explaining that the GAO
interviewed officials in US agencies and NGOs, and collected data to identify civil
lawsuits in order to determine how many A-3 or G-5 visa holders have alleged abuse).
75.
See id. at 11 (after collecting data from 2000-2008, the GAO identified 42
allegations of abuse but noted the actual number of incidents is likely higher).
76.
Id. at 13-16. Other organizations have produced alternative numbers: a
collection of social service organizations have estimated that one-third of their domestic
servitude cases implicate diplomats with immunity; the Spanish Coalition Center in
Washington, D.C. claims to have seen approximately a thousand cases of domestic
worker exploitation by employers with immunity since its inception in 1967; and the
ACLU created its own independent report in 2007 of domestic workers abused by
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Noting considerable deficiencies in enforcement, the GAO
submitted three recommendations asking the government to (1)
collect and maintain records on allegations of household worker abuse
by foreign diplomats; (2) establish a system alerting consular officers
to seek guidance before issuing an A-3 or G-5 visa to an individual
applying to work for a foreign diplomat who may have abused
workers; and (3) spot-check compliance with A-3 and G-5 visa policies
and procedures. " President George W. Bush responded to the
suggestions outlined in the GAO report by signing into law the
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act of 2008 (Act).7 8
The Act specifically aims to reduce the number of domestic
workers falling prey to abusive diplomats by placing limitations on
issuance of A-3 and G-5 visas and enhancing protections for A-3 and
G-5 visa holders employed by diplomats.7 9 The Act requires, inter
alia, that all applicants execute a contract with their employer
containing: (A) an agreement by the employer to abide by all federal,
state, and local laws in the United States; (B) information on the
frequency and form of payment, work duties, weekly work hours,
holidays, sick days, and vacation days; and (C) an agreement by the
employer not to withhold the passport, employment contract, or other
personal property of the employee. 8 0 Moreover, a consular officer
must conduct a personal interview with the applicant outside the
presence of the employer during which the officer reviews the terms
of the contract and the fair labor standards in the United States.8 1
Importantly, the Act further stipulates that "the Secretary shall
suspend ... the issuance of A-3 visas or G-5 visas to applicants
seeking to work for officials of a diplomatic mission ... if the
Secretary determines that there is credible evidence that 1 or more
employees of such mission. . . have abused or exploited 1 or more

nonimmigrants holding an A-3 visa or a G-5 visa."82

diplomats, identifying 63 cases that had been publicized in the media, court filings, and
human rights reports. See also Krista Friedrich, Statutes of Liberty?: Seeking Justice
Under United States Law When Diplomats Traffic in Persons, 72 BROOK L. REV. 1139,
1160 (2007) (citing Lena H. Sun, "Modern-DaySlavery" Prompts Rescue Efforts; Groups
Target Abuse of ForeignMaids, Nannies, WASH. POST, May 3, 2004, at Al).
GAO REPORT, supra note 67, at 27.
77.
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 8
78.
U.S.C. § 1375 (2008).
79.
Id. § 203.
80.
See id. § 203(b)(2) (establishing a mandatory contract with three required
provisions).
81.
See id. § 202(e)(1) (requiring the consular office to conduct an interview
with the applicant outside the presence of the employer before issuing or renewing a
visa).
Id. § 203(a)(2).
82.
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While the Act marked an important step in the fight against
exploitation of domestic workers, its sole focus on prevention
significantly limited its impact. As written, the Act gives the U.S.
secretary of state the power to refuse to issue A-3 and G-5 visas under
certain circumstances at the outset, but it does not suspend or limit
the applicability of diplomatic immunity for diplomats suspected of
exploitative practices. 83 Thus, once the employment relationship has
begun in the United States, the absolute immunity of diplomat
employers prevents domestic workers from bringing actions against
their employers for violation of American labor laws, leaving the
question of accountability unresolved.
Even in the event of strict compliance with the Act, an additional
layer of ex post evaluation of employment contracts between
diplomats and their domestic workers is necessary to accommodate
the unique situation of domestic workers. As recognized by the
American Civil Liberties Union, "domestic workers are extremely
vulnerable to exploitation for a variety of reasons including
unfamiliarity with their domestic and international rights, cultural
and language barriers, and in many cases long work hours in
isolation from their peers."8 4 Foreign domestic workers employed by
diplomats on A-3 or G-5 visas are therefore caught in a precarious
situation where previsa issuance measures are incapable of
adequately protecting their rights.
C. The Inability of Domestic Workers to Seek Redress
The experience of Corazon Tabion-one of the first publicized
cases of diplomat abuse of a domestic worker-aptly illustrates the
obstacles facing domestic servants attempting to seek redress. 85
Plaintiff Corazon Tabion left the Philippines in 1989 to work as a
domestic servant for Defendants Faris and Lana Mufti in Jordan.8 6
The employment lasted until 1991, when the Muftis moved to the
United States following Mr. Mufti's appointment to the position of
first secretary at the Embassy of Jordan in Washington, D.C.8 7 The

83.

Usama Kahf, Development in the Debate Over Diplomatic Immunity for

Diplomats Who Enslave Domestic Workers, 1 INTERDISCIPLINARY CONFERENCE ON
available at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/
HUMAN TRAFFICKING 3 (2009),

viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=humtraffconf
[http://perma.cc/8Q3L-HLU7]
(archived Jan. 20, 2014).
84.
Case Profile - Sabbithi, et al. v. Al Saleh, et al., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
(Feb.
15,
2012),
https://www.aclu.orglhuman-rights-womens-rights/case-profilesabbithi-et-al-v-al-saleh-et-al [http://perma.cclS6Y3-R8BA] (archived Jan. 20, 2014).
See Tabion v. Mufti, 877 F. Supp. 285, 286 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff'd, 73 F.3d
85.
535 (4th Cir. 1996) (detailing many of the obstacles domestic workers face when
seeking redress).
86.
Id.
87.

Id.
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Muftis then offered Tabion a position as their domestic servant in the
United States, promising "minimum wage plus overtime, as well as a
reasonable work schedule in a comfortable environment." 88 Yet
during the two-year period that Tabion worked as a domestic servant
for the Muftis in Virginia, the Muftis required Tabion to work sixteen
hours a day at approximately fifty cents per hour, with no
compensation for overtime work.89 Moreover, the Muftis "confiscated
her passport and threatened her with dismissal, deportation, and
arrest if she attempted to leave their household."9 0 Tabion filed suit
against the Muftis for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act,
breaching her employment contract, engaging in intentional
misrepresentations, falsely imprisoning her, and discriminating
against her on the basis of race.9 1
The central question in Tabion v. Mufti concerned the scope of
Article 31(1)(c) of the VCDR, or the commercial activity exception.
The Muftis, claiming immunity from civil suit under the provisions of
the VCDR, maintained that the employment of a domestic servant is
not a commercial activity under the VCDR. Tabion, by contrast,
contended that the exploitation of her labor for personal gain falls
squarely within Article 31(1)(c), which governs any civil action
"relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official
functions."9 2
Setting the stage for what has since become the standard in
cases involving domestic workers exploited by diplomats, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that: (1) the commercial
activity in the VCDR means a business or trade activity for profit and
not contractual transactions for personal goods and services, and (2)
the relationship between a diplomat and a domestic worker is not
commercial activity within the immunity exception." The court also
initiated a trend of deferring to Statements of Interest submitted by
the Executive Branch when interpreting the scope of the commercial
activity exception, as discussed below.9 4

88.
Id.
89.
Id.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
92.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 286.
93.
94.
See Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 539 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Substantial
deference is due to the State Department's conclusion.").
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IV. CONSTRUING THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY EXCEPTION

The Diplomatic Relations Act provides that "any action or
proceeding brought against an individual who is entitled to immunity
with respect to such action or proceeding under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations . . . shall be dismissed."9 5 Hence,

the sole question before the court in cases involving diplomats is
whether the alleged illegal activity falls within one of the enumerated
exceptions. 96 If no exception applies, the court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction to address the case and the case must be dismissed. 97
Thus, the power of the Judiciary to interpret the scope of such
exceptions is of central importance to domestic workers who have
been subjected to exploitation by diplomats.
A. JudicialDeference to Executive Statements of Interest
Despite, or perhaps due to, the crucial importance of the
commercial activity exception, the Judiciary has delegated most of its
interpretive powers to the Executive. To date, most, if not all, cases
involving domestic workers alleging to have been exploited by
diplomats with absolute immunity have been dismissed for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Diplomatic Relations
Act.98 In dismissing these actions, courts have repeatedly relied on
the Statements of Interest submitted by the Executive Branch in
support of the diplomat defendant, which mandate a narrow reading
of the commercial activity exception.9 9
In the landmark decision of Tabion v. Mufti, discussed above, the
court relied wholly on a Statement of Interest submitted by the
Executive Branch that interpreted the commercial activity provision
when dismissing Tabion's action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The
Executive statement claimed that the commercial activity exception
"focuses on the pursuit of trade or business activity; it does not
95.
Diplomatic Relations Act, supra note 9, § 254(d).
96.
See, e.g., Baoanan v. Baja, 627 F. Supp. 2d 155, 160-61 (2009) (stating that
any action against someone who is entitled to immunity under the VCDR must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, unless the action falls within one of the exceptions
effectuated by Article 31).
97.
See, e.g., Montuya v. Chedid, 779 F. Supp. 2d 60, 62 (D.D.C. 2011)
(asserting that "[i]f the Court, therefore, concludes that Defendants are entitled to
diplomatic immunity, it must dismiss the action").
See e.g., Tabion, 73 F.3d at 538 (deferring to the State Department's
98.
narrow interpretation of the commercial activity exception, as communicated through a
Statement of Interest, and ultimately dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction under the Diplomatic Relations Act); Montuya, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 61
(same); Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123, 143 (2d Cir. 2010) (same); Sabbithi, 605 F.
Supp. 2d at 124 (same); Gonzalez Paredes v. Vila, 479 F. Supp. 2d 187, 189 (D.D.C.
2007) (same).
99.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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encompass contractual relationships for goods and services incidental
to the daily life of the diplomat and family in the receiving State." 0 0
The court justified the significant weight attributed to the Executive
statement by stating: "[T]he court . .. is mindful that the VCDR is not
a unilateral document; what may prevent parties from obtaining
redress in our courts also serves to protect American diplomats and
their families from what we might consider as legal abuses overseas.
This balancingis a policy decision this Court should not challenge."10 '
Subsequent courts addressing cases of domestic workers
exploited by diplomat employers similarly accepted and deferred to
Executive Statements of Interests. For example, in Gonzalez Paredes
v. Vila, the State Department instructed the court: "When diplomats
enter into contractual relationships for personal goods or services
incidental to residing in the host country, including the employment
of domestic workers, they are not engaging in 'commercial activity' as
that term is used in the Convention."' 02 Two years later, in Sabbithi
v. Al Saleh, the State Department submitted a similarly phrased
Statement of Interest, again emphasizing that the employment
relationship between a diplomat and a domestic worker is not a
commercial activity.103
The deference paid to the Executive Branch by courts confronted
with the issue of diplomatic immunity is not unfounded. The Supreme
Court has held that "although not conclusive, the meaning attributed
to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their
negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight." 104
Accordingly, lower courts have held that "[a] Statement of Interest
filed by the United States, while not dispositive, is entitled to great
deference." 0 5 Yet in cases involving domestic workers exploited by
diplomats, the distinction between a Statement of Interest being
entitled to great deference as opposed to it being dispositive has been
difficult to discern.106 The Carreracourt explicitly acknowledged the
tendency of courts to conflate the two standards in the context of
diplomatic immunity, stating that "courts are disposed to accept as
conclusive of the fact of the diplomatic status of an individual

100.
Id.
101.
Montuya, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 65.
102.
Gonzalez, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 193.
103.
Sabbithi, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 130.
104.
United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989) (citing Sumitomo Shoji
America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982)).
105.
Gonzalez, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 193 (citing Stuart, 489 U.S. at 369).
106.
For example, in Sabbithi, the court concluded its analysis of the Convention
by stating, "In view of the State Department's determination that the defendants are
diplomats and its certification that as diplomats they are immune from suit pursuant
to the Vienna Convention, the Court concludes that these defendants are entitled to
diplomatic immunity." Sabbithi, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 126. (citing Gonzalez, 479 F. Supp.
2d at 192). In doing so, the court clearly indicated that the statement was dispositive.
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claiming an exemption, the views thereon of the political department
of their government." 0 7 Thus, while courts continue to pay lip service
to this principle of limited deference, any meaningful distinction has
been largely eroded in practice. 0 8
B. Executive Fear of Reciprocity
The government's unwillingness to construe the commercial
activity exception more broadly stems from a fear of reciprocity-the
principle that a state adopts and returns the behavior of another
state, potentially leading to a cycle of diplomatic disruptions. 0 9
In an international system dependent on well-functioning
diplomatic relations, the threat of reciprocity carries significant
weight. As Eileen Denza, professor of international law, explains:
[T]he establishment of diplomatic relations and of permanent missions
takes place by mutual consent, every State is both a sending and
receiving State. Its own representatives abroad are in a sense hostages
who may on a basis of reciprocity suffer if it violates the rules of
diplomatic immunity, or may be penalized even for minor restrictions
1 10
regarding privileges or protocol.

In addition to the risk of foreign nations disproportionately punishing
minor acts by American officers in retaliation, commentators have
raised the concern that foreign governments may fabricate charges
against U.S. Foreign Service officers abroad if the United States
prosecutes foreign diplomats at home."'
American diplomats abroad have long experienced the wrath of
reciprocity. In a rather mild altercation between the United States
and Russia, Russia rescinded the American embassy's beach
privileges on the river at Nikolnaya Gora in direct response to the
United States' decision to rescind recreational privileges for Russian
diplomats living in Glen Cove, Long Island. 112 In another incident,
eighty-seven Americans received moving violations outside the U.S.
Embassy in Manila, Philippines, immediately following the ticketing

107.
Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496, 497 (D.C. Cir.1949) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
108.
Gonzalez, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 193 (citing Stuart, 489 U.S. at 369).
109.
See, e.g., EILEEN DENZA, UNITED NATIONS, VIENNA CONVENTION ON
DIPLOMATIc RELATIONS 1-2 (2009), available at http://legal.un.org/avl/pdflha/
vcdr/vcdr..e.pdf [http://perma.ccl9CGJ-BVSZ] (archived Jan. 20, 2014).
110.
Id.
Ross, supra note 30, at 203 (citing Diplomatic Crimes Legislation:Hearings
111.
Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 102, at 11-13
(1987)); Government Workers at Home ... And Abroad, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1987, at
A14).
Ross, supra note 30, at 203 (citing Griffin, Diplomatic Impunity, 13
112.
STUDENT L. 18, 20 (1984)).
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of illegally parked Philippine diplomats in the District of Columbia.1 13
The ongoing case of Devyani Khobragade further provides a more
recent example of the reality of reciprocity that more closely mimics
the facts discussed in this Note.
Deputy Consul General for India Devyani Khobragade was
arrested by U.S. authorities on December 12, 2013, for "lying in her
visa application for the purposes of recruiting an Indian national who
was employed as housekeeper at her home and was paid less than $4
an hour, which is lower than the U.S. minimum wage."" 4 Following
Khobragade's arrest, India's politicians expressed outrage over the
United States' "despicable and barbaric" treatment of their consul,
which included a strip search, a DNA swab, and placement in a
prison cell with drug addicts." 5 Consequently, India forced all U.S.
diplomats stationed in the country to turn in their identity cards,
removed police barricades outside the U.S. embassy in New Delhi,
and blocked access for U.S. diplomatic staff to airports in a general
boycott against the five-member U.S. delegation to New Delhi. The
Khobragade case is distinguishable from the cases discussed in this
Note since the post of deputy consul general only entitled Khobragade
to consular immunity, which is more limited than diplomatic
immunity. 116 However, India's reaction to the treatment of their
consul clearly demonstrates the risks and reality of reciprocity.
Sensitive to the threat of reciprocity, the Executive Branch has
repeatedly sought to "protect American diplomats and their families
from what we might consider as legal abuses overseas" 117 by blocking
any effort to infringe on the absolute immunity of foreign diplomats
in the United States. In defense of this strategy, congressional and
Executive policymakers have agreed that "the apparent inequity to a
private individual is outweighed by the great injury to the public that

113.
Id. (citing Turan, The Devilish Demands of Diplomatic Immunity, WASH.
POST, Jan. 11, 1976, at 11 (describing the consequences of arresting a diplomat under
the 1790 Act)).
114.
India-US Spat over Diplomat's Arrest Escalates with Official Boycott, AL
JAZEERA AMERICA (Dec. 17, 2013), available at http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/
2013/12/17/india-us-row-escalatesoverdiplomatsarrest.html [http://perma.cc/6KRN-5M8K]
(archived Jan. 20, 2014); see Gardiner Harris, Outrage in India, and Retaliation, Over a
Female Diplomat's Arrest in New York, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2013), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/18/worldlasia/outrage-in-india-over-female-diplomatsarrest-in-new-york.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/XPP4-HWE5] (archived Jan. 20, 2014).
115.
India-US Spat Over Diplomat's Arrest Escalates With Official Boycott,
supra note 114.
116.
See Narayan Lakshman, No Retroactive Immunity For Devyani, Says U.S., THE
HINDu (Dec. 21, 2013), http://www.thehindu.com/news/internationallworld/no-retroactiveimmunity-for-devyani-says-us/article5481901.ece available at [http://perma.cc/3Z9U-A37J]
(archived Jan. 20, 2014).
117.
Montuya, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 65.
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would arise from permitting suit against the entity or its agents
calling for application of immunity."11 8
As demonstrated above, the narrow interpretation of the
commercial activity exception espoused by the Executive Branch and
the Judiciary's unconditional deference thereto have effectively
blocked access to the courts for domestic workers exploited by
diplomat employers.
V. LIMITATIONS OF PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO RETHINK
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

In addressing possible solutions to the lack of redress for those
suffering the consequences of absolute immunity, commentators have
primarily suggested the following approaches: (1) asking the sending
state to waive immunity; 119 (2) isolating nations that abuse VCDR
provisions;1 20 (3) creating a fund to compensate victims of foreign
diplomats;121 (4) interpreting some of the VCDR's provisions more
restrictively; 122 and (5) amending the VCDR. 123 Each of these
proposed solutions falls short in solving the dilemma facing domestic
workers exploited by diplomats.
A. Waiver of Immunity

Convincing a sending state to waive diplomatic immunity for one
of its officers is arguably the most effective way of holding diplomats
accountable for unlawful acts. 124 This approach also comports with
the letter of the VCDR. As one commentator noted, "If the sending
state waives its diplomat's immunity, the receiving state does not
infringe upon any of the Vienna Convention's protections when the
receiving state acts against the offending diplomat." 125 Yet this
method is rarely used, as it seldom works in practice; "all too
frequently, governments allow diplomats to use immunity as a shield,
even when the waiver of immunity would be a relatively trivial
step."126 The limitations of the waiver method were exposed in the

118.
Id. at 64-65 (quoting Tabion, 73 F.3d at 539).
119.
Farhangi, supra note 31, at 1526.
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
Id.
124.
Id.
125.
Id.
126.
Id. at 1526-27. But see Richard Dowden, Diplomat to Face Drugs
Questioning, THE TIMES (London), Mar. 6, 1985, at 3, col. 1 (mentioning how Zambia
agreed to waive the immunity of a diplomat who was wanted for questioning in
connection with allegedly smuggling heroin worth 1.2 million pounds (sterling) into
Britain through Pakistani diplomatic baggage).
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recent case of Sabbithi v. Al Saleh.'2 7 In Sabbithi, a Kuwaiti diplomat
and his wife brought three women of Indian nationality to the United
States under false pretenses, where they were subjected to physical
and psychological abuse by the Al Saleh family and forced to work as
domestic employees and childcare workers against their will under
slave-like conditions. 2 8 The U.S. Department of Justice filed criminal
charges against the diplomat couple and called on the State
Department to request a waiver of immunity from Kuwait. When
Kuwait declined to waive the defendants' immunity, the Department
of Justice closed its investigation.1 29

B. Forced Isolationof Noncomplying Nations
The United Kingdom has considered isolating nations that abuse
VCDR provisions, such as when a host country refuses to grant
immunity.130 Isolation is highly problematic because it fails to strike
a balance between maintaining positive diplomatic relations and
protecting the rights of people within the host country's borders.' 3 1
While the practical consequences remain unknown, one can conceive
of two likely results: (1) such a measure may intensify threats of
reciprocity and thus disrupt, rather than protect, the peaceful
coexistence among nations; or (2) it may simply be ineffective, as
evidenced by other forms of sanctions historically undertaken by
nations in attempts to change the status quo.132

C. Creation of a Claims Fund
In exploring ways to strike a balance between maintaining broad
immunity while also providing victims with a means for redress, the
United States has considered the possibility of establishing a claims
fund. 133 Under this approach, domestic workers seeking redress

127.
Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 122 (D.D.C. 2009).
128.
Case Profile, supranote 84.
129.
Sabbithi, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 125-26. But note how, in an interesting turn of
events, this case ended up agreeing to a confidential settlement with the women in
February 2012. Domestic Workers Who Accused Diplomats of Human Trafficking Settle
with Kuwaiti Government, supra note 81.
130.
Farhangi, supra note 31, at 1528.
131.
Id. at 1529.
132.
See id. at 1529-30 ("'There are all kinds of measures that might be taken,
measures in trade, measures in cultural circles, not receiving ballet dancers, all these
kinds of things.' Unfortunately, history has shown that isolating a nation through
trade or cultural sanctions has little more than symbolic effect. These sanctions do not
change the wrongdoers' behavior and, since a change in countries' behavior is the goal,
a different and more effective answer to the problem must be found." (citations
omitted)).

133.

Id. at 1528 (citing DiplomaticImmunity: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm.

on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 at 35 (1978) (testimony of Lawrence
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would draw compensation from a government-funded financial pool
rather than go to court.' 3 4 While this proposal has attracted some
support among critics of the current system,13 5 the feasibility of such
a system depends on the availability of extensive resources. History
suggests that such resources are simply not available. 136 In the
1970s, the government did, in fact, institute a claims fund in response
to increased pressure from interest groups complaining of diplomatic
immunity abuses. 137 The fund, however, failed due to logistical
difficulties in processing claims. 3 8 Between April 10, 1974, and April
39
9, 1977, about twenty complaints remained unresolved every year.'
Little suggests that a different result would occur today, as resources
remain scarce and Executive agencies are hobbled by bureaucracy.
D. Amending the Convention
Perhaps the most radical solution to the current deadlock
involves amending the VCDR to allow victims of abuse to bring
actions against diplomats.1 4 0 While commentators disagree on what
such an amendment would entail, one commentator has proposed
amending Articles 22 and 27 of the VCDR to vest the International
Court of Justice with the authority to punish noncomplying nations
with suspension from the United Nations.141 Under this approach,
each country would be forced to lodge monetary bonds with the
International Court of Justice as "security for good diplomatic
behavior."14 2 While promising in theory, the process of amending the
VCDR necessarily involves a number of significant roadblocks. Most
importantly, the absence of an amendment provision in the VCDR
means that the Member States would first have to reach an
agreement on the necessary procedures for changing the VCDR before
they could even address the merits of such changes.1 43 Thus, the
logistics of any endeavor requiring the active participation and
will likely prove to be
States
consensus of Member
insurmountable.144
Blumberg); R. Scott Garley, Compensation for "Victims" of Diplomatic Immunity in the
United States: A Claims Fund Proposal,4 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 135, 136-37 (1980)).
134.
Ross, supra note 30, at 192 (citing Garley, supra note 133, at 149-59).
135.
See, e.g., Garley, supra note 133, at 149.
136.
FREY & FREY, supra note 10, at 496.
137.
Id.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
Farhangi, supra note 31, at 1536 (citing Brett, Giving the Diplomatic Rules
140.
Some Teeth, THE TIMES (London), Apr. 28, 1984, at 8, col. 2; S. Res. 395, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-2 (1984)).
141.
Id. at 1536.
142.
Id.
143.
Id.
144.
Id.; see FREY & FREY, supra note 10, at 496-97.
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E. Adopting a Restrictive Interpretationof the Text

A final alternative would be to adopt a restrictive reading of the
text of the Vienna Convention, which would limit the immunity
granted to diplomats. This proposal effectively addresses the abuse of
diplomatic immunity by working within the existing framework of
international law, thus obviating the need for unlikely waivers,
worldwide consensus, or significant governmental resources. 4 5
Those who dismiss the possibility of pursuing a more restrictive
reading of diplomatic immunity claim that the VCDR is explicit and
unambiguous, and thus there is no room for reinterpretation.146 Yet,
as demonstrated infra in Part VI.A.2.ii., the plain language of the
VCDR actually compels a more restrictive reading of the commercial
activity exception than that adopted by courts today. 147
The proposed solution of a more restrictive reading is entirely
consistent with and overlaps with the solution set forth in this Note.
However, it stops short of addressing the obstacles that must first be
addressed in order to enable a more restrictive reading-namely, the
undue interference of the Executive Branch with the Judiciary's
interpretation of the text and the Judiciary's excessive deference
thereto. In other words, the value and feasibility of this approach is
wholly dependent on an overlooked precondition: for a more
restrictive reading of the VCDR to be viable, separation of powers
must be restored. Thus, this Note builds on the restrictive-reading
approach to provide a framework for how exploited domestic workers
may initiate actions against diplomat employers.
VI. SOLUTION
This Note urges the United States to adopt a functional necessity
approach to diplomatic immunity. A functional necessity approach, as
conceived here, dictates a more restrictive scope of immunities that
gives due force to the exceptions explicitly provided for in the
VCDR.148 Such a restrictive scope to diplomatic immunity not only

145.
Farhangi, supra note 31, at 1533.
146.
See, e.g., id. at 1533-34 ("On the question of waiver of immunity, for
example, the Vienna Convention states: "The immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic
agents ... may be waived by the sending State. Waiver must always be express." Given
the clarity of this provision, it is difficult, if not impossible, to argue that a diplomat
perpetrating serious crime has gone beyond her function and so forfeits her status and
is subject to the criminal law. She cannot have "forfeited" her immunity as such waiver
must be express.").
See infra in Part VI.A.2 (providing a roadmap for a permissible and logical
147.
reading of the commercial activity exception that would exclude immunity for
diplomats engaged in the exploitation of domestic workers).
148.
See supra Part II.A.
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comports with the text, purpose, and spirit of the VCDR itself but also
solves the issue of accountability. 149 In contrast to today's de facto
rule of immunity-even for nonofficial acts clearly outside the scope
of the diplomatic mission-a functional necessity approach allows
plaintiffs to have their cases decided on the merits. While the
approach hardly guarantees that immunity will be waived in cases
involving domestic workers alleging exploitation, it at least affords
plaintiffs an opportunity to seek redress.
Recent developments in Chile illustrate the feasibility of such a
theoretical shift from extraterritoriality, "whereby the foreign
embassy was deemed to be the territory of the sending State and acts
of diplomats consequently given unrestricted immunity," toward "a
functional interpretation of official acts, willing to recognise
immunity only in those cases which are of a functional nature."1 50 In
two successive decisions, the Chilean Supreme Court reversed the
lower courts' dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
pursuant to the VCDR. 151 In rendering its decision, the court
proclaimed that "[d]iplomatic and consular immunities . . . could no

longer stand as an obstacle to the exercise of jurisdiction when the
protection of fundamental rights was at stake."152 Instead, the court
adopted traditional notions of functional necessity, whereby
"immunities would cover only 'acts performed in the exercise of
official functions."' 153
From a cost-benefit perspective, it could be argued that since a
shift toward more restrictive immunity would result in increased
hostility toward the United States among sending states, it would
likely increase the likelihood of reciprocity. The heightened threat of
reciprocity, then, would still outweigh the significant benefit of
providing workers exploited by diplomats with opportunities for
redress. While such reasoning may be valid, it fails to consider the
unique nature of the costs at issue here. In contrast to minor acts of
reciprocity that cause mere inconvenience or relatively minor costs
such as parking tickets, the government's tacit acceptance of the
exploitation of domestic workers by diplomats involves a serious
encroachment on fundamental rights. As asserted by the Chilean
Supreme Court, "Diplomatic and consular immunities .. . [can] no

See supra Part II.A.
149.
Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Diplomatic and Consular Immunities and
150.
Human Rights, 40 INVL & COMP. L.Q. 34, 39-40 (1991).
151.
Id. at 39 (citing Corte de Apelaciones [C. Apel.] [court of appeals], 26 mayo
1988, "Hoyer, Walter c. Primer Consejero de la Embajada de la Republica Federal de
Alemania," Rol de la causa: F. DEL M. vol. 356 p. 390 (1998) (Chile); Corte de
Apelaciones [C. Apel.] [court of appeals], 25 abril 1988, "Skrabs, Manfrad c. Consoul de
la Repdblica Federal de Alemania," no declarada.).
Vicuna, supra note 150, at 39.
152.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
153.
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longer stand as an obstacle to the exercise of jurisdiction when the
protection of fundamental rights [are] at stake." 154 While the
heightened threat of reciprocity may be real, it is a small price to pay
to protect the fundamental rights of those within our borders.

A. Facilitatingthe Transition to a Functional Necessity Approach
Each of the three branches of government should undertake
independent actions to facilitate the adoption of a functional necessity
reading of diplomatic immunity. The following subparts outline the
ways in which each branch of government may contribute to the
necessary shift in attitude on the issue of diplomatic immunity.
1.

The Executive: Reevaluating Costs and Benefits

Even in the event of a restoration of separation of powers and a
subsequent paradigm shift, Executive statements will likely continue
to influence courts in their interpretation of the VCDR, as Statements
of Interest are not inappropriate per se. Indeed, Executive opinions
on the correct reading of international treaties are worthy of great
deference; it is only when they become dispositive, whether expressly
or effectively, that they raise constitutional concerns. To effectuate a
shift toward the functional necessity theory underlying the VCDR,
the Executive Branch must reevaluate the cost-benefit analysis
currently justifying its policy in favor of broad immunity.1 5 5 While
petty instances of abuse, such as unpaid parking tickets, may
warrant absorbing the costs of abuse of immunity to protect against
reciprocity, the emergence of forced servitude in the United States
has reconfigured the relative importance, and implications, of broad
versus narrow immunity.
In reconsidering its cost-benefit analysis, the Executive should
consider new costs that weigh against broad diplomatic immunity
and have been consistently devalued thus far. Such costs include the
harm suffered by individuals exploited by diplomats, the injury to
human and civil rights within the United States, and the risk of
damaging the nation's reputation of being at the forefront of the
human rights struggle. As the world continues to develop, it will
become increasingly difficult for a modern nation like the United
States to characterize exploitation and forced servitude as a
reasonable price to pay for protection against reciprocity.

154.
Id.
155.
See Tai, supra note 6, at 179 ("[The State Department should guide courts
to apply an alternative interpretation of the VCDR's immunity exceptions, rather than
the current, narrower interpretation, which allows diplomats to hide behind a shield of
diplomatic immunity and consequently prevents domestic workers from litigating their
claims.").
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The Judiciary: Reexamining the Text of the Commercial Activity
Exception

While limiting the Judiciary's deference given to Statements of
Interest hardly guarantees that the courts will adopt a more
permissive interpretation of the exception, a review of the text and
relevant canons of construction certainly speaks in favor of a broad
commercial activity exception. Appellant's brief in Tabion v. Mufti
provides a compelling roadmap for a permissible-and logicalreading of the commercial activity exception that would exclude
immunity for diplomats engaged in the exploitation of domestic
workers while staying true to the spirit and text of the VCDR.1 56
i.

Deducing Intent from the Literal Language

To interpret the VCDR, judges should first consider the literal
language. 157 If such language is unambiguous, it controls and no
further inquiry is necessary or appropriate. 15 8 Analysis of the literal
text of the VCDR involves comparing the language used across
sections.1 59 In doing so, it is generally presumed that Congress acted
intentionally when it included particular language in one section of
the statute but omitted it in another.160 Here, a compelling argument
for a broader reading of the commercial activity exception, which
comports with the functional necessity theory's emphasis on
restrictive immunity, suggests reading Article 31 with Article 42 of
the VCDR since these two articles both contain the phrase
"commercial activity."'16 Article 42 of the VCDR states: "A diplomatic
agent shall not in the receiving State practise for personalprofit any
professional or commercial activity."162 In contrast, Article 31 states
that diplomatic immunity will be waived for "an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent
in the receiving State outside his official functions."163 Importantly,
Article 42 contains the limiting qualifier "for personal profit,"
whereas Article 31 contains no such restrictive language. 164
Application of widely recognized canons of construction suggests that

156.
Brief of Appellant Corazon Tabion, Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535 (1996) (No.
95-1732), 1995 WL 17054954 [hereinafter Tabion Brief|.
157.
Id. at *8.
158.
Id.
159.
Id. at *10 (deducing the meaning of a statute from its literal language)
(citing BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1994).
160.
Id. (citing BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1994).

161.

Id. at *12.

162.
163.
164.

VCDR, supra note 7, at art. 42 (emphasis added).
Id. at art. 31(1)(c).
Id. at arts. 31(1)(c), 42.
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the omission was intentional. 165 Moreover, whenever the text of a
statute or treaty intentionally uses broad language, it is appropriate
to infer a broad application of the provision. 166
ii.

Ordinary Meaning

Even if the omission does not convey clear intent as to the
definition of commercial activity, "it is a recognized canon of
construction that unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted
as taking their ordinary and common meaning." 167 The ordinary
meaning of "commerce" involves the exchange of goods and
services. 168 Therefore, commercial activity involves the act of
contracting for goods and services. One would be hard pressed to
argue that in hiring a domestic worker, a diplomat does not engage in
an exchange for services.
iii. Legislative History
Although courts are not required to look beyond unambiguous
language,169 the legislative history and purpose of the VCDR lend
further support to a liberal reading of the commercial activity
exception. 170 The drafters explicitly noted that "the third exception
arises in the case of proceedings relating to a professional or
commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent outside his
official functions." 171 Hence, "[i]f the diplomatic agent engages in
such an activity, those with whom he has had dealings in so doing
cannot be deprived of their remedy at law." 172 Since exploitation of
domestic labor for personal gain does not further the diplomatic
mission, such exploitation falls outside of the officials' functions and
1 73
therefore is exempt from immunity.

Tabion Brief, supra note 156, at *10-11.
165.
Id.
166.
Id. (noting that statutes should be construed under their plain and
167.
ordinary meaning) (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 44 (1979)).
Id.
168.
Id. at *16.
169.
Id.
170.
171.
Id. at *17.
Id.
172.
Id.
173.
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The Legislature: Clarifying the Role of the Judiciary

The Legislature may also play an important role in defending the
rights of exploited domestic workers by facilitating a shift away from
the policy-centered interpretations provided by the Executive Branch
and toward judicial independence in evaluating claims brought under
the VCDR. The history of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act
(FSIA) 74 provides some guidance on how this may be done. In the
case of the FSIA, a nearly identical separation of powers issue
attracted widespread criticism from commentators, leading Congress
to take legislative action to clarify the role of the Judiciary in
construing the language of the FSIA.175
Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, notions of sovereign
immunity for foreign enterprises were largely dictated by the
Executive Branch. 176 As more foreign enterprises began to request
immunity, the State Department grew increasingly involved in the
affairs of the Judiciary.17 7 Such intrusion into the judicial sphere drew
much criticism from foreign corporations, which identified the
separation of powers issue underlying the State Department's
interference with judicial interpretation of the FSIA.178 Commentators
argued that the State Department's suggestions "were more often
based on political and diplomatic concerns than on a legal and factual
basis." 7 9 In response to these constitutional concerns, Congress took
explicit action to clarify the role of the Judiciary in construing the
FSIA. It passed an amendment that explicitly "transfer[red] the
power to determine the existence of immunity to the courts rather
than the State Department."' 8 0
Similarly, Congress could speak directly to the allocation of
power between the Judiciary and the Executive with regard to
interpreting the VCDR. Such an express transfer of power would
circumvent the issue of convincing the Executive Branch to go against
its own policy and curb its own powers.' 8 1

174.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1601-11 (governing consular and foreign sovereign
immunities).
175.
Gary Jay Greener, Comment, The Commercial Exception to Foreign
Sovereign Immunity: To Be Immune or Not To Be Immune? That Is the Question-A
Look at the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property, 15 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 173, 17677 (1992).
Id.
176.
177.
Id.
178.
Id. at 177.
179.
Id. at 176-77.
180.
Id. at 177.
181.
See discussion of such policies and the cost-benefit analysis underlying
them supra Parts III.A, IV.B.
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As demonstrated, each branch of government can and should
play a role in facilitating and accommodating a shift toward a
functional necessity approach. This shift is important for three
reasons: (1) it comports with the text, purpose, and spirit of the
VCDR; (2) it partially solves the accountability issue by allowing
domestic workers to bring actionable claims against diplomat
employers; and (3) it restores the separation of powers among the
three branches of government.

VII. CONCLUSION

In exploring the social, political, and legal factors contributing to
the deadlock facing domestic workers who have been exploited by
diplomats, this Note has highlighted the United States' clear move
away from the theoretical underpinnings of the VCDR toward a
highly politicized definition of the scope of diplomatic immunity. Such
a shift is problematic on multiple levels. American case law is now
directly at odds with the spirit of the VCDR, which was originally
enacted to curb blanket immunity of diplomats by shifting the focus
from the individual to the diplomatic mission at large. In stark
contrast to the drafters' intent to extend immunity only to official acts
taken in the furtherance of diplomatic missions, the United States
has rejected all attempts at distinguishing between official acts and
actions taken for mere personal gain. Moreover, the shift has
undermined the separation of powers among the branches of
government, raising concerns about the constitutionality of the
current, per se policy against restricting the immunity of diplomats.
By appropriating the interpretive function of the courts, the
Executive Branch has encroached on territory reserved for the
Judiciary.
In order to remedy the implications of such a shift, this Note
proposes a concerted effort by all three branches of government to
facilitate a return to the functional necessity approach underlying the
VCDR. The proposal is two fold. First, it involves a power shift
between the Executive and Judiciary, whereby the Executive Branch
agrees to cease actively interfering with the courts' examination of
diplomat defendants pursuant to the VCDR. Once the interpretive
function is returned to the courts, the courts must reevaluate the
body of law that has been distorted by the political involvement of the
Executive and instead revert to the letter of the law itself. It is during
this second step that a revival of the functional necessity approach
will be crucial to victims of abuse of immunity who have thus far been
shut out of the courts. In reasserting the interpretive function of the
Judiciary, courts should respect the plain text, purpose, and spirit of
the VCDR by moving toward a more restrictive view of diplomatic
immunity that comports with a functional necessity reading of the
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VCDR. Increased judicial scrutiny of diplomatic immunity solves the
accountability issue by allowing victims to try claims of exploitation
against diplomat employers on the merits without facing outright
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
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